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by infection site, but together, the adverse consequences of nosocomial infections and their associated costs are substantial (Table 1) .
Hospitalized patients are at unusually high risk of infection for various reasons. They tend to be more susceptible to infection because of their underlying disease conditions, but their risk is compounded when they are exposed to certain invasive procedures. If the patient is immunocompromised, microorganisms that are not normally pathogenic are capable of causing disease. Furthermore, the hospital environment supports the acquisition of resistance to antibiotic agents by pathogens, complicating the treatment of infections due to drug-resistant pathogens.
In this review, we will use data from the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) system, which is conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and data published by others to describe the epidemiology of nosocomial infections, including the sites of infection, etiologic agents, and antimicrobial agent resistance. The NNIS system is the only source of national data on nosocomial infections and currently consists of 149 hospitals that voluntarily report to CDC their nosocomial infection data, which are collected under standard surveillance protocols and infection definitions (37, 48, 70) . We will focus on endemic infections, i.e., those that occur in an ongoing fashion, rather than epidemic infections, i.e., those that occur in outbreaks, since epidemic infections are estimated to represent only 5% of all nosocomial infections (132) . We will discuss current approaches to infection control, particularly those that pertain to patients who are at highest risk of infection, and the essential role of the microbiology laboratory in infection control. We will not discuss in detail the infection control measures used to protect workers in the hospital or laboratory from the risk of infection.
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF NOSOCOMIAL INFECTIONS
The study of nosocomial infections includes understanding the causes of these infections, the characteristics of the patients who become infected, and how often these infections occur. By identifying the characteristics of patients who are at highest risk for infection, we can more effectively direct and prioritize our prevention and control efforts. It also permits us to follow closely the trends of infections that are increasing in incidence, e.g., bloodstream infections (4) .
The epidemiology of nosocomial infections has been affected by the introduction of the prospective payment system, which changed the economics of health care delivery in the United States (82, 84, 87) . The patients admitted to hospitals now differ from those admitted only a few years ago. More surgical operations are being performed in outpatient settings, and when patients are admitted to the hospital, they are more seriously ill or require sophisticated, and sometimes high-risk, procedures that can be performed only on inpatients. Paradoxically, they are usually discharged from the hospital earlier (104) , and their care is usually continued at home or in skilled-nursing facilities. With increasing average severity of illness among hospitalized patients, the infection rate is also expected to increase. The task of monitoring the infection rate is complicated by the difficulty of detecting infections in patients following discharge from the hospital. Postdischarge surveillance for certain infection sites may be necessary for a quality surveillance system and is being urged by some experts (69) . Definitions A nosocomial infection is one for which there is no evidence that the infection was present or incubating at the time of hospital admission. To be classified as an infection, the condition must be manifested as a clinical disease and not a colonization, which means that microorganisms are present but have no adverse effect on the host. However, an asymptomatic patient may be considered infected if pathogenic microorganisms are found in a body fluid or at a body site that is normally sterile, such as the cerebrospinal fluid or blood.
If surveillance data are to be used to accurately describe the epidemiology of nosocomial infections in the hospital, the definitions of nosocomial infections must be scientifically sound and applied uniformly. The most widely used definitions, published by CDC, contain laboratory and clinical criteria for infections at 13 major and 49 specific sites (48, 70) . Infections at almost all of the major sites can be determined by clinical criteria alone, although laboratory results, particularly microbial cultures, provide additional evidence of the presence of an infection. A few infection types require positive cultures, such as asymptomatic bacteriuria and laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infection. These criteria are used to answer three questions that are necessary before an infection is included in the surveillance data: (i) Is an infection present? (ii) At which body site? (iii) Is the infection nosocomial? The preventability of the infection is not a consideration in the decision to include an infection in the surveillance data. Furthermore, surveillance definitions are not intended to define clinical disease for the purpose of making therapeutic decisions. Some true infections will undoubtedly be missed, while conditions that are not infections may be erroneously counted.
Site Distribution
The incidence of nosocomial infections varies by body site and is determined to a large extent by underlying disease conditions in the patients and their exposure to high-risk medical interventions, such as surgical operations and invasive devices. Of all infections reported during 1990 through 1992 by the 80 NNIS system hospitals that reported data from the hospital-wide surveillance component, the most common were urinary tract infections (UTI), followed by pneumonias, surgical site infections (SSI), and primary bloodstream infections (BSI) ( (4) .
The distribution of infection sites is considerably different in each of the major hospital services (Table 3 ). The differences can largely be explained by variations in exposure to high-risk devices or procedures. For example, because patients who have a surgical operation usually are not on the medical service, the number of SSI on the medical service will be small. Similarly, UTI occur infrequently on the pediatric and newborn services because these services rarely use urinary catheters, which are the major risk factor for nosocomial UTI. This illustrates the importance of grouping patients with similar risks before attempting to compare distributions of infections or infection rates (105 (25, 26, 46, 89, 92, 94, 106, 131, 145) .
(i) High-risk medical devices. There are numerous reasons why the nosocomial infection rate among patients exposed to certain devices is many times greater than that among those not exposed to such devices (76 (19, 20) . Guidelines developed by other infection control and (ii) Operative procedures. Despite the efforts of surgeons and the operating room team to optimize the patient's condition and the environment for performing operations, SSI constituted approximately 15% of the infections reported to the NNIS system in 1991 by hospitals that collected hospital-wide surveillance data. The overall percentage of nosocomial infections that are SSI has not changed appreciably in the last decade. SSI are a major infection control concern because they are associated with serious morbidity and mortality and high cost (66, 67, 111) . Patients who undergo an operation also have higher rates of infection at other sites, such as pneumonia, UTI, and BSI (65) . The higher rates are most likely related to the use of high-risk devices such as ventilators, urinary catheters, and central intravascular lines during surgery and in the postoperative period.
The risk of SSI is related to a number of factors. Among the most important are the operative procedure performed, the degree of microbiologic contamination of the operative field, the duration of the operation, and the intrinsic risk of the patient (47, 73) . Because infection control practices cannot ordinarily alter or eliminate these risks, SSI rates must be adjusted for these risks before the rates can be used for comparative purposes. An SSI risk index that effectively adjusts SSI rates for most operations has been developed by the NNIS system (27) .
Not all infections related to extrinsic risk are preventable, since the benefits of the continued use of a high-risk device or the performance of a necessary operation may outweigh the risk of infection. However, if a hospital is experiencing infection rates in excess of those reported by other hospitals among patients with similar risks, further investigation is warranted to determine whether an infection control problem exists.
Therapeutic and Environmental Pressures
Antibiotics. Antimicrobial agents have had a profound effect on the character of nosocomial infections. Approximately 25 to 35% of hospitalized patients receive systemic antibiotics (88) . However, it has become abundantly clear that the major nosocomial pathogens either are naturally resistant to clinically useful antimicrobial agents or possess the ability to acquire resistance. Every major class of bacterial pathogens has demonstrated an ability to develop resistance to one or more commonly used antimicrobial agents (42) . Evidence for the altered virulence-whether VOL. 6, 1993 on January 4, 2018 by guest http://cmr.asm.org/ Downloaded from (19, 20) . The key premise of universal precautions is that all persons are considered to be infected with a blood-borne pathogen, which requires anyone who is likely to be coiftaminated with blood and certain other body fluids to use barrier protection, such as gloves, protective eyewear, gowns, and masks. All sharp instruments, such as used needles and scalpels, must be handled so as to prevent injuries and discarded properly. Regardless of whether universal precautions are in force, the patient care staff must not forget the critical role of handwashing in preventing the transmission of nosocomial infections (17, 133) .
NOSOCOMIAL PATHOGENS Distribution
For all infections reported to the NNIS system by hospitals using the hospital-wide component during 1990 through 1992, Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus aureus were the most commonly isolated nosocomial pathogens (Table 5) . Although E. coli is found in a quarter of UTI cases, it is isolated relatively infrequently from other infection sites. Conversely, S. aureus is rarely isolated from UTI but is common at other sites. In BSI, coagulase-negative staphylococci (CoNS) are isolated almost twice as often as S. aureus. Enterococcus spp. are frequently isolated from UTI, SSI, and BSI but rarely found in the respiratory tract. Pseudomonas aeruginosa is isolated from about 1/10 of all infections and appears to evenly affect all of the major sites except the bloodstream, where it is found less often.
Trends
To determine whether the frequency of the most common pathogens isolated from nosocomial infections reported to the NNIS system has changed, we compared the pathogens reported during 1990 through 1992 with those in earlier published reports (125) . From 1986 through 1989, E. coli was the most common isolate (16%) reported to the NNIS system, followed by enterococci (12%), P. aeruginosa (11%), S. aureus (10%), and CoNS (9%). Compared with the 1970s, the pathogens associated with nosocomial infections changed dramatically during the 1980s. Unfortunately, the pathogens associated with nosocomial infections were more often difficult to treat with antibiotics. For example, the percentage of infections with P. aeruginosa and Enterobacter spp. increased, while those with E. coli decreased. The reporting of CoNS increased dramatically, particularly for blood isolates, from 9% of all pathogens in 1980 to 31% during 1990 through 1992. Although the changes probably represent a true increase in infections with this organism, there has been an increased propensity to report CoNS in cultures as true pathogens rather than as contaminants, as in the past (134) .
EMERGING PATTERNS OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE
Soon after the introduction of penicillin into general medical use in the 1940s, it was recognized that bacteria would develop resistance to antibacterial agents. By 1948, most of the staphylococci isolated in British hospitals were resistant to penicillin. As other antimicrobial agents were introduced, organisms resistant to them were isolated from infected patients or from the environment. This has developed into a cycle of antimicrobial agent development, introduction into clinical use, and the development of resistance-often to the point where the antimicrobial agent becomes useless.
Gram-Positive Organisms
The increasing number of antimicrobial agent-resistant gram-positive nosocomial isolates is illustrated by the reports that show an increasing prevalence of S. aureus strains resistant to beta-lactam antibiotics in U.S. hospitals (7, 117, 139) . Using data from the NNIS system, we recently analyzed the changes that occurred among U.S. hospitals over a 17-year period, 1975 Gram-Negative Organisms In recent years, several reports have emphasized the development of antibiotic resistance among gram-negative bacilli, especially Klebsiella pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa, and Enterobacter spp. These organisms are increasing in incidence among nosocomial pathogens largely because of their ability to express certain resistance phenotypes (125) .
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the prevalence of aminoglycoside-resistant gram-negative bacilli increased but was found to vary considerably among individual hospitals (11, 31, 72, 85, 121, 142) . More recently, the availability of second-and third-generation cephalosporins and other extended-spectrum beta-lactam agents has shifted attention from the aminoglycosides toward a different set of resistance mechanisms for these gram-negative bacilli (1, 49, 118) . Concern over resistance to beta-lactam agents among nosocomial gram-negative pathogens has heightened recently because of the increased availability and use of these drugs, particularly cephalosporins. The development of extendedspectrum beta-lactamases has been explosive; more than two dozen beta-lactamases among gram-negative bacilli have been described since 1983 (116). K pneumoniae serves as a distinctive example. In one hospital, the minor DNA base pair substitutions in the gene for a beta-lactamase, termed SHV-1, showed dramatic changes in the substrate specificity of the new enzyme, which evolved into an enzyme giving resistance to cefotaxime, which had been used in large quantities (107) . The changes observed in the gene from the nosocomial isolate were easily reproduced in the laboratory. Moreover, the gene was plasmid borne and capable of transfer at high frequency.
Other types of resistance among nosocomial gram-negative bacilli also became apparent in the 1980s. Enterobacter spp. were considered initially susceptible to cefamandole but began to develop resistance during therapy due to a spontaneous derepression of intrinsic chromosomal type I betalactamase (110, 124) . This mechanism of resistance is widespread. In a recent six-hospital study of 136 cases of Enterobacter bacteremia, one-third of the isolates were resistant to all cephalosporins and penicillins tested (24) . Recent data from the NNIS system suggest that resistance to the third-generation cephalosporin ceftazidime increased from 31% in 1987 to 38% in 1991 (9) .
Imipenem is the broadest-spectrum parenteral antimicrobial agent that is commercially available and has remained a useful drug for gram-negative bacilli that have developed resistance due to a spontaneous derepression of intrinsic chromosomal type I beta-lactamase. However, in our study of isolates reported by NNIS system hospitals from 1986 through 1990, resistance to imipenem occurred in 11% of 4,026 nosocomial P. aeruginosa and in 1.3% of 1,825 nosocomial Enterobacter spp. isolates (49) . Our analysis concurs with a previous report that imipenem resistance is more common among ICU isolates than among isolates from non-critical care units (81) . We also found that imipenem resistance among P. aeruginosa was more common in teaching hospitals and in isolates from the respiratory tract than in those from the bloodstream, urinary tract, or surgical wounds. Although the factors associated with imipenem resistance among Enterobacter spp. were similar to those among P. aeruginosa, the low rate of imipenem resistance and the relatively small numbers of isolates in our study resulted in a low probability of detecting any but very large differences.
In contrast to P. aeruginosa, imipenem resistance among Enterobacter spp. did not increase significantly from 1986 through 1988 to 1989 through 1990. Among NNIS system teaching hospitals, a 25% increase in imipenem resistance was seen between the two periods when we controlled for the other risk factors in the logistic regression model. The reasons for the difference between the stable trend among Enterobacter spp. and the increase in imipenem-resistant P. aeruginosa isolates are unknown but may be due to differing rates of mutation for membrane-associated porin protein production between the two genera (10, 137, 138) . Although no data on antibiotic use are available, it is reasonable to assume that imipenem use has increased in NNIS system teaching hospitals since the drug was released in the United States in 1986. It is also possible that the increase in imipenem use was greater among teaching hospitals than among nonteaching hospitals.
Although the pharmaceutical industry continues to develop new antimicrobial agents to combat resistant strains, the number of new agents has decreased because the cost of research and development is high. Once on the market, newer agents are expensive, usually exceeding the cost of older antimicrobial agents, and they drive up health care costs. Most of these newer agents are too expensive for use in developing countries, forcing them to use cheap but ineffective antimicrobial agents or limiting the availability of therapy for all infected patients. It is imperative that antimicrobial agents in clinical use, and those scheduled for release soon, be used judiciously. Since the number of new antimicrobial agents in the marketplace is decreasing, new antimicrobial agents that simply replace those that are no longer effective cannot be relied upon to deal with the problem of resistance.
ROLE OF THE LABORATORY IN INFECTION
CONTROL The success of the hospital's infection control efforts hinges to a large extent on the active involvement of the laboratory in all aspects of the infection control program. Laboratory personnel should understand why infection control is necessary, the approaches being taken by the hospital's infection control program to meet its objective to reduce nosocomial infections, and how the laboratory can support and cooperate with the program.
Development of Infection Control Programs
In the 1940s and '50s, severe S. aureus pandemics caused substantial morbidity and mortality in U.S. hospitals. In part because of these pandemics, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of (80) . However, faced with growing numbers of drug-resistant pathogens, increasing use of high-risk medical interventions, and the introduction of more immunosuppressive agents and therapies, hospitals, along with regulatory and accrediting organizations, began to realize that a committee alone cannot adequately deal with the problem of nosocomial infections. In most hospitals, the committee directs the infection control activities, but its members, already responsible for other hospital functions, usually do not have the time or the skill to perform the day-to-day duties of infection control. In the 1960s, infection control programs were begun in U.S. hospitals, and a new health care professional, the infection control practitioner (ICP), was introduced. In the United States, there is now an ICP in almost every hospital (40) . According to a recent study, most ICPs are registered nurses, although some have other professional backgrounds; 9% are either medical technologists or respiratory therapists (6) . The Association for Practitioners in Infection Control, a professional organization for infection control, was organized in 1972 and changed its name to the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology in 1993. Physician hospital epidemiologists, who serve as medical directors of the infection control program, particularly in larger hospitals, are growing in number and have their own professional organization, the Society for Hospital Epidemiology of America (35, 58, 129) .
The JCAHO has had considerable influence on the adoption of formal infection control programs in hospitals. As part of its accreditation standards, JCAHO prescribes the broad elements of infection control programs but gives hospitals wide leeway in designing their own infection control programs (79) . JCAHO standards stipulate key organizational structures and functions, which determine the ability of health care institutions to provide quality health care (113) . In 1986, the JCAHO unveiled its Agenda for Change, which is a major research and development project that is expected to culminate in 1996 with the introduction of indicators to assess the actual performance of hospitals (78) . Clinical indicators, including eight in infection control that are currently undergoing phase II pilot testing, are expected to radically change the JCAHO survey process for accreditation (83, 109) . None of the clinical indicators for infection control specifically assess the quality of the microbiology laboratory.
The CDC, through its guidelines development, nosocomial infection surveillance methodology, outbreak investigations, and laboratory studies, has provided much of the scientific and epidemiologic basis for infection control in the United States. It also organized some of the early training for ICPs and hospital epidemiologists. Its landmark study on the efficacy of nosocomial infection control (SENIC Project) demonstrated that, to be effective, nosocomial infection programs must include the following components: (i) organized surveillance and control activities, (ii) adequate number of trained infection control staff, and (iii) a system for reporting SSI rates to surgeons (64) . Other organizations have made important contributions to infection control, particularly the American Hospital Association (3), the American Society for Microbiology, and specialty groups, such as the American College of Surgeons and the Association of Operating Room Nurses. Individual states also promote infection control through regulations in their health codes and hospital licensure standards.
Surveillance of Nosocomial Infections
Surveillance is defined as "the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of health data essential to the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice, closely integrated with the timely dissemination of these data to those who need to know" (21) . Surveillance, which is an essential element of an infection control program, provides the data to identify infected patients and determine the site of infection and the factors that contributed to the infection. When infection problems are recognized, the hospital is able to institute appropriate intervention measures and evaluate their efficacy. Surveillance data are also used to assess the quality of care in the hospital. If the data collected are to be most useful for decision making, the hospital should focus on their most important and predominant problems and use surveillance methods that adhere to sound epidemiologic principles.
The nosocomial infection surveillance system may be sentinel event based or population based or both. A sentinel infection (or sentinel group of infections) is one that clearly indicates a failure in the hospital's efforts to prevent infections and, in theory, requires individual investigation (128) . Denominator data are usually not collected in sentinel eventbased surveillance. Sentinel event-based surveillance will identify only the most serious problems and should not be the only surveillance system in the hospital. Populationbased surveillance, that is, surveillance that is done on patients with similar risks, requires both a numerator (the infection) and denominator (number of patients or days of exposure to the risk). If the infection rates are to be used for interhospital comparisons, the rates must be adjusted for patients' intrinsic and extrinsic risks of infection (105) . To calculate risk-adjusted rates from population-based surveillance data, corresponding risk factors in both the numerator and denominator must be collected. The risk factors may be patient characteristics such as underlying disease conditions, or they may be procedures or devices used to diagnose or treat the patient.
The NNIS system employs a population-based surveillance system that provides risk-adjusted rates that can be used for interhospital comparisons (37 (98) . The diagnostic practices of the physicians practicing in the hospital are an important factor in the ability of the infection control program to detect infections, since most infections are identified through microbiologic cultures and other laboratory tests (61) . If most of the patients in the hospital are treated empirically, without cultures being done, the infection control program cannot use culture results as its primary source for detecting infections and must instead adopt clinically based infection criteria. The infection control program staff, through various hospital committees, may be able to influence physicians' diagnostic practices to encourage appropriate culturing and other testing.
Accurate and complete denominator data. Where to obtain denominator data and how to collect them vary among hospitals, depending on the sources available in the hospital and the resourcefulness of the infection control program in gaining the cooperation of the patient care staff and other hospital departments. In a recent survey that we conducted of NNIS system hospitals, only 30% of the ICPs reported that the staff in the patient care areas collect the denominator data for them (38) .
Analysis and dissemination of data to those who need the information. Surveillance is incomplete until the data are analyzed, interpreted, and disseminated to those who need to have the information (33) . Although the value of reporting back surveillance findings was demonstrated in the SENIC Project, surveillance data are underused in many hospitals. The lack of risk-adjusted rates for most hospitals, which make the data difficult to interpret, may be an important reason why surveillance data are not useful.
Confidentiality of the data. The infection control program must be able to assure the hospital staff and physicians that the surveillance data will be used appropriately. Surveillance (43, 45, 51, 71, 74, 86, 122) . While an overall rate may provide an estimate of the infection problem, the value of such surveillance systems has recently been questioned. In order to monitor all patients for infections, a wide range of information sources must be reviewed in an ongoing fashion, and low-risk and high-risk patients are given equal time. Otherwise, the surveillance intensity will be uneven, resulting in an unacceptably low case-finding sensitivity. Furthermore, because most of the time is spent finding infections, there is little time left to collect data to adjust the rates by risk. A more efficient and effective alternative to hospital-wide surveillance is to focus on patients with the highest risk for infection. With the exception of the hospital-wide component, the NNIS system surveillance components are examples of surveillance protocols that target high-risk patients.
Strategies for identifying infected patients. Surveillance for nosocomial infections should be done prospectively, that is, patients should be actively and continuously monitored for infections while they are still in the hospital. The casefinding methods used to detect infected patients depend on the sources of information available in the hospital. In most hospitals, the microbiology laboratory reports are the most useful and efficient source for initial case finding (56).
However, the microbiology laboratory should not be the sole source for case finding since cultures are not done for all patients with infections. Other sources of information to detect possible infections include the nursing care plan cards (Kardex) (146) , antibiotic orders in the pharmacy, radiologic reports, autopsies, and verbal reports from patient care personnel. Like laboratory results, most of these require verification with other data, such as clinical findings recorded on the patient's medical record, to determine an infection site.
Use of surveillance data for continuous quality improvement. Over the last decade, the use of nosocomial infection rates as a basis for measuring quality of care has received considerable attention. The SENIC Project estimated that one-third of the nosocomial infections that occurred in the United States during 1975 through 1976 could have been prevented by optimal infection surveillance and control programs (64) . To assist hospitals in using surveillance as a more effective tool to reduce nosocomial infection rates, Haley integrated surveillance with the concepts of management by objective and coined the term surveillance by objective (59) . He designed an approach for the hospital staff to collaboratively set goals for reducing infections at specific sites and to concentrate their efforts on the elements of the infection control program found to be most effective by the SENIC Project (60) . The results of the SENIC Project coincided with the efforts of the government and other purchasers of health care to control costs by demanding that the health care industry assess and be accountable for the quality of care provided (29, 119, 120, 123) .
Continuous quality improvement is a general model for improving quality through continuous evaluation of performance in order to identify opportunities to improve the product or outcome (28) . It is an approach that has been widely adopted by industry, including the health care industry, to provide high-quality products and services at a competitive and affordable price (126) . Because the collection of reliable data is an essential element of this evaluation Hospitals use data to assess their quality of care by comparing their infection rates with external benchmark rates or by comparing changes in rates over time in their own hospitals. Many hospitals assume that any difference in the rates represents the success or failure of the patient care staff or institutional practices in preventing nosocomial infections. While this may be true, there are other factors that could account for the differences in the rates. First, surveillance definitions or techniques may not be uniform among the hospitals or may be used inconsistently over time, causing variations to occur in sensitivity and specificity in infection case finding. Second, inaccurate or insufficient information about clinical and laboratory evidences of infections in the patient's medical record may seriously affect the validity and utility of the infection rate. The microbiology laboratory plays an essential role as a source of information on nosocomial infections and is discussed later. Third, the rates may not be adjusted for patients' intrinsic risks for infection. These risks are usually outside the control of the hospital and vary from hospital to hospital but are important factors in determining whether the patients will develop an infection. For example, a hospital with a large proportion of immunocompromised patients would be expected to have a population at higher intrinsic risk for infection than a hospital without such a population of patients. The unsuccessful attempts to compare unadjusted mortality rates (53, 77) are reminders to those comparing infection rates that they must also pay attention to risk-adjusted infection rates (44, 62) . Finally, the size of the population at risk (e.g., number of patients, admissions and discharges, patient-days, or operations) may not be large enough to calculate rates that adequately estimate the "true" rates for the hospital.
Although it may not be possible to fully correct for these factors, hospitals should be aware of how they can affect the infection rate and take them into consideration when interpreting the data.
Specific Laboratory Support Functions
The microbiology laboratory should be actively involved in the infection control program. As the source of microbiologic culture information, the laboratory must provide easy access to high-quality and timely data and give guidance and support on how to use its resources for epidemiologic purposes (102) . Other publications on this subject are also informative (141, 143 Because only a limited number of nosocomial pathogens exhibit bacteriophage susceptibility, this procedure has a relatively narrow application. Furthermore, because considerable experience is required to reliably perform phage typing, the procedure should be done by a reference laboratory (75) . Another technique, serotyping, is used for the typing of gram-negative bacilli, especially P. aeruginosa (54) . Still other typing techniques that use molecular biology have added to the variety of typing techniques available. Among the most common are plasmid profiles and the digestion of plasmid or genomic material with restriction endonucleases (101) .
The appropriate use of these typing methods, some of which are redundant, is important. The key factor in deciding which method to use involves examination of how much discrimination the method can add. Surprisingly, some of the simplest, least expensive, and most available typing methods may be the best. For example, in a study of infections with CoNS, antimicrobial agent susceptibility profiles, biotyping, phage typing, and plasmid profiling were performed. The antimicrobial agent susceptibility profiles proved to be the most discriminating (91) . Test results may vary when tests are performed by inexperienced technicians or when specimens are processed in different batches. The microbiology laboratory should decide which of the typing tests it can do reliably on site and which should be sent to appropriate reference laboratories.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent changes in the economics of health care have changed the infection risk of patients in the hospital. While progress has been made in preventing and controlling nosocomial infections, these infections nevertheless continue to cause morbidity and mortality, leading to increased health care costs. Infection control programs should focus on preventing infections in patients who are at highest risk of infection because of exposure to certain procedures and medical devices.
Antibiotic resistance continues to be a major threat in hospitals. Vancomycin-resistant CoNS and enterococci are becoming more common. The emergence of vancomycinresistant S. aureus could have disastrous consequences. The resistance of gram-negative organisms to the second-and third-generation cephalosporins and other extended-spectrum beta-lactam agents is increasing. The growing resistance to imipenem is particularly troublesome because it has the broadest spectrum of the commercially available parenteral antimicrobial drugs that are effective against P. aeruginosa.
The microbiology laboratory should be involved in all aspects of the infection control program. Particularly important are its roles in the hospital's infection surveillance system and in assisting the infection control program to effectively and efficiently use laboratory services for epidemiologic purposes. Through the infection surveillance system, the infection control program collects data on nosocomial infections in the hospital, the pathogens and their patterns of antimicrobial agent resistance, the factors that contributed to the infections, and their outcomes. The purposes of surveillance are to identify possible infection problems, monitor infection trends, and assess the quality of care in the hospital.
Tracking infection rates is necessary to compare the hospital's infection experience with that at other hospitals or at its own hospital over time. To make valid comparisons, the infection rates must be adjusted for the most important intrinsic and extrinsic risks of infection. When risk-adjusted infection rates are compared, significant variations in the rates may suggest the need for further investigation to identify possible infection control problems.
Much has been learned in the past 30 years about how epidemiologic techniques can be used to prevent and control nosocomial infections (147) . Other programs to measure outcomes of hospital care will benefit from the experiences of the infection control program as hospitals meet the continuing challenge to improve the quality of patient care. 
